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Walter W Steele, Jr. *
HE key role played by the prosecutor in the American criminal
justice system is well known and obvious. Beginning with the clas-
sic studies of De Long and Baker in the 1930s,' extensive literature
has described the role and function of the prosecutor, 2 concentrating
mainly on the following three prosecutorial functions: (1) the prosecutor's
discretionary function (decisions to charge and the associated problem of
discretion);3 (2) the prosecutor's advocate function (conduct at trial);4 and
(3) the prosecutor's processing function (moving court dockets), which has
been described both impressionally5 and statistically. 6
Of the three areas, this Article examines only the advocate function-
conduct at trial. Specifically, the discussion here is limited to an analysis
of the ethicality of prosecutors during trial and concludes with an analysis
of the adequacy of the disciplinary mechanisms customarily used to deal
with prosecutorial misconduct at trial.
To date, most analyses of the prosecutor's office have emphasized how
that office relates to other parts of the criminal justice system, or have em-
phasized the means and techniques of prosecution. Perhaps the time has
* LL.B., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., University of Texas. Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University.
Editor's Note: Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Disciplinary Rules (DR)
and Canons are to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
1. See Baker, The Prosecutor. Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 770 (1933); Baker & DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney Provisions of Law
Organizing the Office, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 926 (1933).
2. For representative works, see J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH
FOR IDENTITY (1980); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME (1970); Mills, The Prosecutor. Charging and "Bargaining," 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
511.
3. F. MILLER, supra note 2, at 151.
4. See, e.g., Comment, Prosecutortal Misconduct-Recent Second Circuit Cases, 2 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 385 (1974).
5. See, e.g., THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK (P. Healy & J. Manak eds. 1971): Uviller,
The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard Guidancefrom the A.B.A., 71 MICH.
L. REV. 1145 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Oaks & Lehman, The Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent
Defendant, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 584. A more complete analytical approach is found in Cox,
Prosecutorial Discretion.- An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383 (1976), but its scope is
limited to discretion. See also Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial
Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 644 (1972) (extensive discussion of remedies for misconduct by
prosecutors and judges).
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come in the evolution of things to think less about relationships and tech-
niques and to think, instead, about the prosecutor's ends and purposes.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has stated that the "[tihe legal pro-
fession must continue to develop an awareness of the importance of a vig-
orous, fair, and efficient prosecution system and give high priority to the
sponsorship and support of those measures necessary to implement this
objective."'7
Can prosecution be vigorous, fair, and efficient without reference to the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, or to its new analogue, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Should a prosecutor meet or ex-
ceed the minimal ethical standards announced by the bar through the
Code of Professional Responsibility? If the mounting criticism by the bar
and by the public about the ethics of the legal profession is justifiable and
realistic, then it would seem that more emphasis should be given to the
ethicality of the prosecutor's office than to techniques of the act of prosecu-
tion, as has been the case heretofore. 8
At one point the ABA took the position that prosecutors should adopt a
higher standard of conduct than lawyers generally. The 1958 ABA report
concerning professional responsibility stated that the public prosecutor
must not use the standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of an indi-
vidual client as a guide for the conduct of his office. 9 The report further
asserted that if the prosecutor's duties are to be properly discharged, the
freedom granted to a partisan advocate must be severely curtailed.' 0
Later, however, when the ABA adopted the Standards for the Prosecution
Function they defined the term "unprofessional conduct" as "conduct
which, in either identical or similar language is or should be made subject
to disciplinary sanctions pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity in force in each jurisdiction.""II
Despite these expressions of intent to hold prosecutors to the ethical
standards of other lawyers, both scholars and bar grievance committees
have paid scant attention to prosecutorial ethicality, and consequently,
prosecutors may have developed a sense of insulation from the ethical
standards of other lawyers. Flagrant misconduct by prosecutors appears to
be increasing. 12 Unfortunately, this trend is not of recent origin. As early
7. PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS Standard 3-1.1 commentary (1980).
8. One author commented:
[T]he general disillusionment with the criminal process, from the outside and
from within, is a matter for considerable regret. For, inter alia, we do count
upon this system, awkward as it may be, to gratify our need to believe that our
government is capable of playing a creditable part in the drama of justice.
Uviller, supra note 5, at 1167.
9. Professional Responsibility. Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218
(1958).
10. Id.
11. PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS Standard 3-1.1(e) (1980).
12. Despite time-honored rules regarding the conduct of a criminal trial and the
approval of the American Bar Association in 1971 of new standards relating to
the prosecution and defense functions, throughout the past decade appeals
courts have confronted the issue of misconduct by prosecutors. In their efforts
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as fifty years ago, Roscoe Pound observed that the number of incidences of
prosecutorial misconduct was substantial and compared the phenomenon
to the abuses prominent during the seventeenth century. 13
In the half-century since Pound's foreboding, court after court has
sounded the alarm in unmistakable language, such as: "flagrant abuses of
professional standards,"' 4 and "[tihis Court has been increasingly faced
with meritorious claims of prosecutorial misconduct contrary to clearly ex-
pressed precedent."' 15 One court, faced with a growing number of
prosecutorial misconduct cases, stated that the great number of
prosecutorial misconduct cases involving particular prosecutors indicates
that the abuses are deliberately calculated and not isolated instances of
overzealous trial conduct. 16
This Article examines the extent and nature of violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by prosecutors during trial. Finally, it offers
some suggestions concerning a new approach to imposing sanctions on
prosecutors who violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
I. DOES THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLY
TO PROSECUTORS?
To suggest a need to discuss whether the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility applies to prosecutors may appear sophomoric. In its Standards for
the Prosecution Function, the ABA applies the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility to prosecutors, 17 and the National District Attorneys Associa-
tion does the same in its National Prosecution Standards.'" In addition,
several cases have applied the Code of Professional Responsibility to pros-
ecutors with little or no discussion of any underlying doubts, 19 and the
to deter misconduct courts have reiterated existing guidelines, decried the
amount of cases appealed on the grounds of prosecutorial error, and
threatened imposition of sanctions if the practice continues.
Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct. The Limitations upon the Prosecutor's Role as an Advocate,
14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1095, 1095-96 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
13. R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 187 (1983).
14. United States v. Falk, 605 F.2d 1005, 1016 (7th Cir. 1979).
15. People v. Biondo, 76 Mich. App. 155, 256 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Mich. 1977).
16. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citation omitted).
17. PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS Standard 3-1.1(d) (1980) states: "It is the
duty of the prosecutor to know and be guided by the standards of professional conduct as
defined in the codes and canons of the legal profession."
18. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 25.1 (National District Attorneys
Ass'n 1977) states in part:
A. To ensure the highest ethical conduct and maintain the integrity of prose-
cution and the legal system, the prosecutor shall be thoroughly acquainted
with and shall adhere at all times to the Code of Professional Responsibility as
promulgated by the American Bar Association and as adopted by the various
state bar associations.
19. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 76 Ariz. 49, 258 P.2d 433 (1953) (district attorney disbarred
for accepting payoff from prostitute); In re McCowan, 175 Cal. 51, 170 P. 1100 (1917) (prose-
cutor suspended for 1 year); In re Friedman, 76 IUl. 2d 392, 392 N.E.2d 133 (1979) (prosecu-
tor admitted violating Code even though not formally adopted by prosecutor for that




United States Supreme Court has made passing reference to the amenabil-
ity of prosecutors to discipline under the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. 20 Other courts, however, in what appear to be well-reasoned opinions,
have expressed varying degrees of doubt about the applicability of the
Code of Professional Responsibility to prosecutors. These cases raise is-
sues about the relationship between sanctions for professional misconduct,
such as suspension or disbarment, and the ability of a prosecutor to con-
tinue in office. Is disbarment or suspension of a prosecutor's license to
practice tantamount to extrajudicial impeachment from office in violation
of the separation of powers doctrine? Cases raising this issue may be cata-
logued into three groups: (1) those that reject the power of the courts to
impose any sanction on a prosecutor that may be tantamount to impeach-
ment; (2) those taking the opposite view, holding that the power to impose
professional discipline is inherent to the judicial branch and may not be
diminished; and (3) those taking a somewhat peculiar middle ground,
holding that the bar grievance committee may impose professional disci-
pline on a prosecutor, but that the discipline does not affect the prosecu-
tor's official duties.
A leading case rejecting the power to sanction a prosecutor through con-
ventional grievance mechanisms is Simpson v. Alabama.2 1 Interpreting
Alabama statutes as making impeachment the only mechanism to disci-
pline a prosecutor, Simpson held that the bar could not impose profes-
sional discipline on a prosecutor, not even a reprimand. 22 In Snyder's
Case23 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached the same conclusion,
stating that the state bar could not disbar a prosecutor because disbarment
is tantamount to removal from office, which can be accomplished only by
impeachment through procedure set by statute.24 These holdings are not
without logical appeal. Typically, the prosecutor is elected to hold office
for a set period of time, and the customary way to remove any elected
office holder is, after all, impeachment. Whenever a disciplinary sanction
makes it impossible for a prosecutor to function, that sanction has assumed
the role of the impeachment process in a way that may very well be con-
trary to the will of both the electorate and the legislature. On the other
hand, cases holding that professional discipline is an inherent power of the
judicial branch conclude that professional discipline, ipso facto, is not im-
peachment; thus the inherent power of the judicial branch can not be di-
minished by what may be a happenstance result, that is de facto
20. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecu-
tor acting within the scope of his duties was immune from suit for damages under 24 U.S.C.
§ 1983. As part of the rationale for that holding the Court stated: "Moreover, a prosecutor
stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional
rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers." Id. at 429
(citing A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13).
21. 311 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 1975); see also Watson v. Alabama State Bar, 311 So. 2d 311,
312 (Ala. 1975) (Simpson rationale applied to deputy district attorney).
22. 311 So. 2d at 310.
23. 301 Pa. 276, 152 A. 33 (1930).
24. 152 A. at 36-37.
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impeachment. 25 Commonwealth v. Stump26 exemplifies this second group
of cases. The opinion in Stump reviewed other cases at some length and
concluded that the office of prosecutor does not shield or protect the in-
cumbent from a failure to obey his oath and consequent duties as an attor-
ney.27 Like the first group of cases, this second group also has some logical
appeal. After all, holding that prosecutors are immune from professional
discipline is incongruous at the least and intolerable at the most. One
might surmise that the electorate, if asked, would readily accede to the
judiciary the power to discipline a prosecutor for ethical misconduct, even
though the discipline may result in de facto impeachment.
The third group of cases seemingly lacks logical appeal. These cases
take an incongruous approach, holding that the judicial branch has inher-
ent power to discipline a prosecutor, but that such discipline will not di-
minish the prosecutorial function. In Melville v. Wettengel,28 for example,
the court found a lawyer guilty of ethical misconduct serious enough to
justify an indefinite suspension, but ordered that the suspension not affect
that lawyer's performance of duties as district attorney.29 A different court
reached a similar result in In re Maestretti,30 in which the court suspended
a prosecutor for thirty days, but said that the suspension did not apply to
his official duties as district attorney.31 Obviously, if a prosecutor holds a
full-time position, these cases make a mockery of the conventional disci-
pline sanction mechanism.
A Texas court has taken an interesting middle ground. In Phagen v.
State32 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that whenever a prosecutor
loses his right to practice law and thus becomes incapacitated to perform
his office, an affirmative duty arises on the part of the prosecutor to resign
his office, and failure to resign makes that prosecutor a usurper of office.
3 3
This approach cleverly avoids the tension between the judicial branch, the
electorate, and the legislature by making the ultimate act of incapacitation
the act of the prosecutor and not the act of the grievance committee.
25. Clearly, the power to impose professional discipline is an inherent power of the
judicial branch, but it is an inherent power that has been compromised somewhat by the
judicial branch's showing some deference to the legislative branch. See Steele, Cleaning up
the Legal Profession.- The Power to Discipline-The Judiciary and the Legislature, 20 ARIZ. L.
REV. 413 (1978).
26. 57 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1933).
27. Id. at 525; see also In re Jones, 70 Vt. 71, 39 A. 1087, 1090-91 (1898), in which the
court stated:
Notwithstanding he [the prosecutor] might be liable to impeachment, or might
be rejected by the voters ... his conduct when acting in his office of attorney
• . . was open to investigation by this court; and. . . it is, beyond question,
the right and duty of this court to deal with him as justice demands. It may
suspend or disbar him.
28. 57 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1936) (en banc).
29. Id at 701.
30. 30 Nev. 187, 93 P. 1004 (1908).
31. 93 P. at 1005.
32. 510 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ re/'dn.r.e.).
33. Id. at 661-62.
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II. PROSECUTORS' COURTROOM MISCONDUCT TYPIFIED
In the course of thousands of prosecutions occurring annually in Ameri-
can courtrooms, some ethical misconduct by prosecutors is inevitable.
Simply listing examples of such occurrences provides little insight, because
the list does no more than confirm the truism-those things happen.
34
Categorizing the types of misconduct by prosecutors during trial, however,
might be of some benefit. Another useful insight, if it can be gleaned from
the cases, is the frequency of misconduct-is it as pervasive as some of the
writers indicate? 35 Unfortunately, no practical way has yet been found to
measure the frequency of prosecutorial misconduct, except to rely upon
impressions gained from the volume of appellate opinions and the lan-
guage contained therein as to the frequency of such misconduct.
A survey of appellate cases dealing with all types of prosecutorial mis-
conduct reveals a significant number, perhaps a majority, related to the
nonadvocate functions of the prosecutor's office.36 These cases fit rather
easily into categories. For example, instances of unethical conduct can be
found dealing with a prosecutor's responsibility to enforce penal laws, 37 to
screen cases, 38 to account for state funds, 39 and to plea bargain.
40
Another sizeable category of cases concern DR 7-105(A). 41Apparently,
these relatively numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct centering
around DR 7-105 arise from allowing prosecutors to carry on private prac-
tices.42 For example, in In re Truder43 a prosecutor received a severe rep-
rimand for representing victims in a civil case and the state in a criminal
case against the same defendant for the same offense. 44 MacDonald v.
34. For such lists, see Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting At-
torney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1034-41 (1967); cf. Braun, Ethics in Criminal Cases.- A Response,
55 GEO. L. 1048 (1967) (contending that the conduct of prosecutors is sufficiently policed
given the fact they are subject to close scrutiny at the trial and appellate level, as well as by
defense counsel).
35. One author observed: "The academic commentators who have examined the prob-
lem of prosecutorial misconduct have almost universally bemoaned its frequency." Al-
schuler, supra note 6, at 631; see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
36. For a useful list, see Annot., 10 A.L.R. 4 TH 605 (1981).
37. In re Graves, 146 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. 1941) (en banc) (prosecuting attorney ousted in
quo warranto proceeding and reprimanded in grievance proceeding for failing to enforce
gambling, prostitution, and liquor laws).
38. See F. MILLER, supra note 2, at 151.
39. In re Jelliff, 271 N.W.2d 588 (N.D. 1978) (prosecuting attorney suspended for em-
bezzlement; held a violation of DR 1-102(A)(5), (6); also held guilty of comingling state's
funds with his own).
40. In the case of In re Rook, 556 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Or. 1976) (en banc), the court held
that DRs apply to prosecutors and that the prosecutor's conduct in this case, harrassing
another by refusing to plea bargain with defendants until they discharge their retained coun-
sel, clearly fell "within the plain language and intent of DR 7-102(A)(1)." Id. The district
attorney received a public reprimand. Id.
41. DR 7-105(A) provides: "A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or
threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter."
42. See Kizer, Legal Ethics and the Prosecuting Attorney, 79 W. VA. L. REV. 367 (1976-
1977) for a discussion of the inevitable conflicts of interest that arise whenever a prosecutor
engages in part-time private practice.
43. 17 P.2d 951 (N.M. 1932).
44. Id. at 952.
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Musicc4 5 involved similar conflict of interest issues, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a prosecutor violated
DR 7-105 by offering to dismiss a criminal prosecution if the defendant
would stipulate to probable cause for the arrest. 46 Deputies from the dis-
trict attorney's office stipulated that the prosecutor made the offer to pro-
tect the police from a possible civil rights suit for false arrest. The court
stated that a prosecutor's use of a criminal prosecution to prevent a civil
proceeding by the defendant against policemen is improper, even when the
civil case originates from the events that are the basis for the criminal
charge.4 7 No more will be said about the significant number of cases al-
luded to above since the focus of this paper is on misconduct that occurs
during trial.
Earlier commentators have noted the broad scope of unethical trial con-
duct by prosecutors.48 One excellent example of such writing49 presents a
plenary analysis of prosecutorial misconduct including, inter alia, making
statements of personal belief in violation of DR 7-106(C)(4);50 making dis-
paraging remarks about the defendant in violation of DR 7-106(C)(2); 51
and making references to matters not in evidence in violation of DR 7-
106(C)(1). 52 For example, in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Green 3 the
court disbarred a prosecutor for attempted subordination of perjury, and
in Turner v. Ward54 the court reversed a conviction because the prosecutor
knowingly used false testimony. In State v. Socolofsky 5 the court cen-
45. 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
46. 425 F.2d at 375.
47. Id.
48. See Freedman, supra note 34.
49. Note, supra note 12.
50. DR 7-106(C)(4) provides:
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not:
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as
to the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his
analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect
to the matters stated herein.
51. DR 7-106(C)(2) provides:
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not:
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is rele-
vant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other
person.
52. DR 7-106(C)(1) provides:
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by ad-
missible evidence.
53. 365 A.2d 39, 41 (Md. 1976).
54. 321 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1963).
55. 666 P.2d 725, 725-26 (Kan. 1983).
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sured a district attorney for violating DR 7-108(D) 56 when he improperly
communicated with discharged jurors with the intent to harass, embarrass,
or influence their actions in the future, a practice that may be all too
common.
Some unethical conduct by prosecutors remains in the shadows, seldom
addressed by commentators or by appellate opinions. The position of
prosecutor often facilitates the occurrence of violations of either DR 7-
110(B)57 or DR 7-104(A). 58 Frequently, the assignment of a prosecutor to
one particular judge can lead to a team-member kind of rapport between a
judge and "his" prosecutor, a fact that facilitates violations of DR 7-110.
While DR 7-110 makes its statement to lawyers, Canon 3A(4) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct59 makes the judge's obligation to avoid ex parte con-
tacts equally obvious.60
56. DR 7-108(D) (Communication with or Investigation of Jurors) provides:
After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which the
lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make com-
ments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or embar-
rass the juror or to influence his actions in future jury service.
57. DR 7-110(B) states:
In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause another
to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or an official before
whom the proceeding is pending, except:
(1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause.
(2) In writing if he promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing coun-
sel or to the adverse party if he is not represented by a lawyer.
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party
if he is not represented by a lawyer.
(4) As otherwise authorized by law, or by Section A(4) under Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
58. DR 7-104(A) states:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of
the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a
lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other
than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are
or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the inter-
ests of his client.
59. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) (1972) provides:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceed-
ing, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as au-
thorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other
communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. A judge,
however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable
to a proceeding before him if he gives notice to the parties of the person con-
sulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable op-
portunity to respond.
60. In re Dekle, 308 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975), a disciplinary proceeding instituted against a
Florida Supreme Court Justice because of his use of an ex parte memorandum in the prepa-
ration of his judicial opinion, resulted in a finding that his actions constituted impropriety
and laxness. The judge was publicly reprimanded for violating canon 3A(4). Id. at 12.
In In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 256 N.W.2d 727 (1977), a judge had engaged in ex parte
communications with a complaining witness just before a bench trial and attempted to trans-
fer cases, in which the judge had some interest, to his court. As a result of this and other
conduct, the court held that the judge had violated the ethical principles of avoidance of
[Vol. 38
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Two leading cases typify a prosecutor's violation of DR 7-110(B): Tam-
minen v. State,61 from Texas, and In re Conduct of Burrows,6 2 from Ore-
gon. These two cases present an interesting contrast because the court in
Tamminen dealt with the violation as a due process matter and not as a
grievance matter, 63 while the court in Burrows dealt with the violation as a
grievance matter, with the district attorney receiving a public reprimand.6 4
In Tamminen the prosecuting attorney, ex parte, provided the judge with a
dossier of the defendant's past associations with convicted felons. The ap-
peals court characterized that act as "reprehensible prosecutorial miscon-
duct."'65 In Burrows the district attorney's ex parte communication with the
judge related to bail. On appeal the finding of the district court pointed
out the obvious danger of ex parte communications that the judge may be
improperly influenced and inaccurately informed. 66
Violations of DR 7-110(B) are not unique to prosecutors or to criminal
cases,67 but the affinity between judge and lawyer that might lead to ex
parte communications may be greater in criminal cases than in civil cases.
Violations of DR 7-110 are a gross affront to the delicate balances required
to maintain the equilibrium of the adversary system, and one would hope
that such violations would never occur in any type of case. One can hope
that the paucity of reported cases means that relatively few violations of
DR 7-110 exist, but a more realistic surmise might be that, of the many
violations of DR 7-110, virtually all are undetected because the violation
takes place in camera.
Contrasted to the relatively few cases discussing DR 7-110, cases dis-
cussing violations by prosecutors of DR 7-104(A) are somewhat numerous.
Prosecutors have some equities when considering violations of DR 7-104.
This DR has two parts: one part deals with the ethics of a lawyer (the
prosecutor) communicating with an adverse party (the defendant) known
to be represented; the second part deals with the ethics of a lawyer (the
prosecutor) giving legal advice to an unrepresented adverse party (the
defendant).
Whenever a prosecutor becomes involved in the investigative stage of a
proceeding he is in a position to be tempted, if not actually required, to
communicate with a defendant who may or may not be represented. In
court a prosecutor will most certainly encounter unrepresented defendants
who come seeking legal advice about the entry of a guilty plea. The inevi-
tability of these situations together with the ambiguity of a prosecutor's
impropriety and partiality, as proscribed by canons 4, 5, and 13 of the Canons of Judicial
Conduct (applicable prior to October 1, 1974). 256 N.W.2d at 743 n.13. The judge was
suspended from office for five years without pay. Id. at 753.
61. 653 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
62. 291 Or. 135, 629 P.2d 820 (1981) (per curiam).
63. 653 S.W.2d at 802.
64. 629 P.2d at 826.
65. 653 S.W.2d at 802.
66. 629 P.2d at 826.
67. See cases collected in Annot., 22 A.L.R.4TH 917 (1983).
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role when placed in these situations give rise to the equities present when-
ever violations of DR 7-104 are at issue.
Curiously, the appellate courts have dealt primarily with the relation-
ship of DR 7-104 to the investigative-interrogation aspects of investigation,
while largely ignoring the legal-advice giving-plea-bargaining aspects of
prosecution and their relationship to DR 7-104. In United States v. Kil-
lian68 agents of the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on or-
ders of the United States Attorney interviewed a represented codefendant
who was in custody without advising that defendant's attorney. Character-
izing this order by the United States Attorney as highly improper and un-
ethical,69 the court went on to state that the FBI's and DEA's conduct was
truly reprehensible and tarnished the dignity of the offices of the U.S. At-
torney, the FBI, and the DEA.70 Seldom are the facts about the prosecu-
tor's responsibility for interrogation of a represented defendant so clear.
More often, the defendant himself seeks to confer with the prosecutor, as
in People v. Green.71 Nevertheless, the court in Green was very critical of
the district attorney for what it considered a violation of DR 7-104 in re-
sponding to the defendant's request for an audience. 72
In In re Conduct of Burrows73 a district attorney was charged with a
violation of DR 7-104 for talking with a represented defendant who ex-
pressly asked to speak with the district attorney about making a deal that
would allow leniency on pending charges in return for undercover work in
the future. This particular prosecutor took the precaution of specifying
that the conversation about undercover work would not include conversa-
tion about the pending case for which the defendant was represented.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the district attorney
violated DR 7-104 and issued a public reprimand.74 Similar opinions exist
and are neatly summarized in the following statement from United States
v. Thomas:75
[Once a criminal defendant has either retained an attorney or had an
attorney appointed for him by the court, any statement obtained by
interview from such defendant may not be offered in evidence for any
purpose unless the accused's attorney was notified of the interview
which produced the statement and was given a reasonable opportu-
68. 639 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1980).
69. 639 F.2d at 210.
70. Id. Despite the court's highly critical comments, the conviction was not reversed
because the prosecutor did not use the evidence obtained in violation of DR 7-104 against
the offended co-defendant. Id.
71. 405 Mich. 273, 274 N.W.2d 448 (1979).
72. 274 N.W.2d at 453. The court stated:
We hold that while this defendant's initiative and willingness to speak and the
lack of overreaching by the assistant prosecuting attorney are factors to be
considered in mitigation, they do not excuse compliance with the standard of
professional conduct prescribed by DR 7-104(A)(1).
Id.
73. 291 Or. 135, 629 P.2d 820 (1981) (per curiam).
74. 629 P.2d at 826.
75. 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
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nity to be present. To hold otherwise, we think, would be to overlook
conduct which violated both the letter and the spirit of the canons of
ethics. 76
As the previous cases illustrate, appellate court opinions are somewhat
vociferous about a prosecutor's violation of DR 7-104(A)(1), which deals
with communication with a represented defendant.77 By contrast, opin-
ions dealing with a prosecutor's violation of DR 7-104(A)(2), which in-
volves giving advice to an unrepresented defendant, do not exist. These
facts seem incongruous, indeed. Seemingly, prosecutors are forced to deal
with unrepresented defendants seeking to negotiate their own guilty pleas
much more often than with the problems of investigative interrogations of
a represented defendant. A defendant seeking to negotiate a guilty plea
with a prosecutor is in need of legal advice. That the prosecutor and the
defendant are in a direct adversary relationship is self-evident. EC 7-18
states: "The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons
in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their own coun-
sel."' 78 Is a prosecutor's offer of a negotiated sentence to an unrepresented
defendant the giving of "advice" that is expressly forbidden by DR 7-
104(A)(2)? Consider that the defendant is a layman and probably a novice
to the courtroom. Consider that the prosecutor holds an authoritative po-
sition, even in the eyes of seasoned criminal attorneys. Can there be any
doubt that the offer by a prosecutor to negotiate with an unrepresented
defendant is precisely the type of event that DR 7-104(A)(2) seeks to
avoid? If so, why the silence from the appellate courts about this particu-
lar violation of ethical standards? Could it be that no one has thought to
raise the issue? Is a more likely answer that all associated with the issue
avoid it because survival of the American criminal justice system depends
on moving cases, and significant lubricant in that effort is afforded by the
self-representing defendant, who is somewhat contrite?
In conclusion, instances of prosecutorial misconduct are numerous in-
deed. Furthermore, a great deal of that misconduct in the courtroom goes
unreported, either because it occurs in secret or in seclusion or because the
various observers of the misconduct do not complain. In fact, one might
argue that some forms of unethical conduct by prosecutors have become
normative to the system.
76. 474 F.2d at 112. Compare United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974) (informer who recorded conversation with repre-
sented defendant on instructions of prosecutor was not the "alter ego" of the prosecutor),
with McCubbin v. State, 675 P.2d 461, 465-66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (district attorney's
use of information at trial obtained by an informant placed in jail cell with accused mur-
derer was a violation of sixth amendment and resulted in a reversal of conviction).
77. But cf. Pannell v. State, 666 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), in which the
court held that a violation of DR 7-104(A)(I) by a district attorney did not amount to a
violation of state law. Despite the recognition of the state bar as an administrative agency,
the court rejected the proposition that disciplinary rules are "laws" of the state that fall
within the reach of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (1979), which excludes evidence
obtained in violation of the laws of Texas. Id.
78. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 (1980).
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III. REVERSAL OF CONVICTIONS
If unethical conduct by prosecutors in court occurs frequently, numer-
ous disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors should be found, but such
is not the case. Apparently, instead of being dealt with by conventional
grievance processes, prosecutors' unethical conduct often becomes a part
of the law of the case if the defendant appeals the conviction. Thus, we
have a somewhat anomalous phenomenon; unethical conduct at trial by
defense lawyers is dealt with as a grievance, involving administrative fact-
finding and imposing of sanctions that is usually carried out in private, and
only rarely reaches the appellate level.79 On the other hand, unethical trial
conduct by prosecutors is often briefed and argued by both sides in an
appellate court as a part of the errors on appeal. Thus, the appellate
court's opinion becomes a kind of summary judgment as to the propriety
of the prosecutor's conduct in that case. Although this phenomenon might
appear harsh from the standpoint of a prosecutor, it seems to have little
deterrent effect on prosecutors and, as will be demonstrated, is largely dys-
functional from the standpoint of the administration of criminal justice.80
Since appellate courts reverse convictions due to prosecutorial miscon-
duct at trial,8 ' one must ask whether reversing a conviction is an appropri-
ate or useful way to adjudicate prosecutorial misconduct and impose
sanctions. 82 On the face of things, reversing a conviction is not a deterrent
to the prosecutor, but rather a benefit to the defendant. 83 Other reasons
cause the validity of reversal of convictions as a sanction for prosecutorial
misconduct to be suspect. The question on appeal is validity of the convic-
tion, not validity of the prosecutor's conduct per se. If a conviction lacks
79. For a thorough overview of the conventional grievance process, see Nordby, The
Burdened Privilege. Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings, 30 S.C.L. REV. 363, 394-
402 (1979).
80. Some commentators have recognized that the role played by appellate review of
prosecutorial misconduct is dysfunctional yet central to the evaluation and imposition of
sanctions for such misconduct. One commentator stated:
Academic commentators have generally despaired of appellate reversal as an
effective means of controlling prosecutorial misconduct. They have referred
to reversal as a "quasi-sanction" and have said, "Appellate justices time and
time again have condemned . . . poor conduct and warned prosecutors to
keep within the bounds of propriety. Later opinions reflect the result-frus-
trating failure." These academic observers have found it imperative that "two
distinct problems-justice and discipline-be kept separate."
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 645 (footnotes omitted).
81. E.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935), in which the Court reversed
a criminal conviction because of the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's improper sugges-
tions, insinuations, and assertions of personal knowledge before the jury. This is one of the
earliest and most frequently cited cases dealing with the impact of a prosecutor's unethical
trial conduct on the validity of a conviction.
82. Cf DeFoor, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument, 7 NovA L.J. 443 (1983)
(suggesting that reversal of a case may prejudice society more than the prosecutor).
83. In Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the court stated that
repeated reversals for prosecutorial impropriety did not have their desired effect of prevent-
ing acts of prejudicial misconduct. The court went on to speculate that some prosecutors
believe that time spent by a defendant in jail during the lengthy appellate process is enough
to cause the prosecutor to feel that the case was effectively won. Id n.4.
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due process because of the overwhelming taint of a prosecutor's miscon-
duct, reversal is inevitable, but the purpose of reversal is and should be
fairness to the defendant, not the imposition of sanctions on a prosecu-
tor.84 Indeed, many instances of harmless error occur when an appellate
court finds trial misconduct by the prosecutor but does not reverse the con-
viction. 85 In such cases the only apparent sanction for unethical conduct is
that the conduct is described in the opinion, perhaps in opprobrious
terms.8
6
The dysfunction of reversal as a sanction is evident in those instances in
which a disparity arises between the standards established in the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the requirements of the law. These in-
stances create another set of cases in which an express finding of unethical
trial conduct does not result in any sanction. For example, the standards
set forth in DR 7-103 require the prosecutor to disclose any exculpatory
evidence that "tends to. . .mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce
the punishment. '8 7 The law set forth in the cases of Brady v. Maryland88
and United States v. Agurs,89 however, requires a reversal of a conviction
only if the defendent made a specific request for such evidence. 90 If the
defendant served only a general request for exculpatory information on a
prosecutor, the court will reverse the conviction if the evidence withheld
creates a reasonable doubt that previously did not exist.91 Thus, conduct
by a prosecutor could clearly violate the standard set by DR 7-103, while
clearly not violating the standard set by the law, and thus an appellate
court would not reverse the conviction, nor impose a sanction on the
prosecutor.
The most obvious reason for the dysfunction of reversal as a sanction is
the fact that many defendants do not appeal their convictions, or if they do
appeal, they may have failed to properly preserve the error arising from
ethical misconduct. 92 Since reversing cases is such a dysfunctional way to
84. Recently, in United States v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1978, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 104
(1983), the Supreme Court had occasion to discuss this point and held that an appellate
court's supervisory power to reverse a conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct could
not be used to reverse when the misconduct amounted to no more than harmless error.
85. E.g., United States v. Okenfuss, 632 F.2d 483, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1980).
86. See United States v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1979 n. 5, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 104 n.5
(1983).
87. DR 7-103(B).
88. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
89. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
90. 373 U.S. at 87.
91. 427 U.S. at 112-13.
92. One early commentator appropriately summarized the matter in the following state-
ment:
Because prosecutors are obligated to pursue every legitimate means to bring
about a just conviction, they must refrain from using improper methods calcu-
lated to produce wrongful convictions. . . .Resort to such conduct is seldom
grounds for a new trial, however, especially in the absence of a contemporane-
ous objection, unless the resulting unfairness "permeates the entire atmos-
phere of the trial" or prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant.
Furthermore, prosecutorial conduct deemed improper generally will not result
in reversal if the trial court issued curative instructions, the evidence against
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impose sanctions for unethical conduct, one cannot help but wonder why
appellate courts, with their inherent power over discipline, have not struc-
tured more formidable and sanction-specific remedies. When from the
record, the briefs, and the arguments on appeal, the appellate court has
found a prosecutor's conduct to be unethical, why is the court content sim-
ply to decide whether or not to reverse the conviction? Why do the appel-
late courts avoid imposing sanctions against an offending lawyer directly?
In fact, a few appellate courts have addressed that issue, but in most cases
they have suggested that the trial court should do something about impos-
ing sanctions, and for the most part these appellate opinions are lacking in
any suggestion that the appellate court, itself, may impose sanctions
against those whom it has judged to be violators of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.
A typical example of this apellate court hesitancy is Rodriguez v. State,93
in which the appellate court found that "this case approaches the limit to
which a prosecutor may strain the patience of justice . . . . 94 The court
affirmed the conviction for lack of reversible error and then made this
somewhat insipid remark:
Further, judicial acquiescence in such misconduct only marks it
with a silent seal of approval, making it the acceptable norm for all
other prosecutors. In the face of this kind of impropriety, trial judges
must not fear to move decisively in using their admonishment and
contempt powers to assure that the proper ends of justice and the in-
tegrity of our legal system are preserved. 95
Another example of a typically modest approach occurred in United
States v. Singleterry.96 In what was the fourth consecutive opinion by that
appellate court to criticize the same named prosecutor for the same kind of
improper conduct, the court went no further than a final warning that to
appear as counsel in federal court is a forfeitable privilege. 97 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals gave more thorough consideration to the prob-
lem in United States v. Modica.98 The court listed the following three
strategies that an appellate court could adopt to deal with improper court-
room conduct: (1) a reprimand of the offending prosecutor by name in a
publicized opinion; (2) a direction to the trial court to initiate appropriate
disciplinary action; and (3) the imposition of sanctions such as suspension
from all courts in the circuit.99 Not uncharacteristically, however, the
court in Modica placed most of its reliance on the trial courts to deal with
the defendant is otherwise overwhelming, or the conduct itself can be con-
strued as a response invited by the defendant.
Project: Tenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts ofAppeals 1979-1980, 69 GEO. L.J. 211, 467-68 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
93. 644 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no pet.).
94. Id. at 202.
95. Id. at 209.
96. 646 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982).
97. 646 F.2d at 1020.
98. 663 F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
99. 663 F.2d at 1185.
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the problem. ' 00
One appellate court, the Florida District Court of Appeals, has declared
an intention to take direct action whenever it finds an instance of profes-
sional misconduct. In Jackson v. State'0 the Florida court stated that
whenever the appellate court adjudicates an instance of prosecutorial mis-
conduct in the future, it will also determine the appropriateness of initiat-
ing a disciplinary investigation.'0 2 This approach, while apparently
unique, seems both manifest and just; one wonders why it is so rare.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
Prosecutors' unethical trial conduct is too common and too destructive
to ignore. Any amount of misconduct by a prosecutor is intolerable be-
cause of the unique and powerful position he plays in the criminal justice
system.' 0 3 Frequent misconduct by prosecutors is subversive to the per-
ception that the American legal profession is capable of self-policing pro-
fessional standards. Spread on the public record of our national case
reporter system is conduct such as a prosecutor's directing an undercover
informant to attend and to record surreptitiously a private conference be-
tween defendants and their defense counsel, 104 and a prosecutor's making
an ex parte tender of evidence to a judge in chamber. 10 5 Realizing that
such cases provoke little or no outrage among the legal profession and very
rarely result in any disciplinary investigation or sanction causes one to
wonder how the appearance of fairness and professionalism in the Ameri-
can legal system has survived.
Before suggesting improvements, perhaps it would be useful to review
some reasons for the failure of our present institutions to stop trial miscon-
duct by prosecutors. A fuller appreciation of some of the current dysfunc-
tions will enhance the ability to evaluate the workability of any given set of
suggestions for change.
As a functional matter, the witnesses to trial misconduct are often lim-
100. The court stated that "[wie deem it sufficient to express our concerns and to alert the
district courts to their range of remedies, with confidence that the proper discharge of their
responsibilities will prove to be a sufficient deterrent." Id. at 1185-86.
101. 421 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
102. Id. at 17.
103. The ABA has appropriately stated:
The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the
standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client. The
freedom elsewhere wisely granted to partisan advocacy must be severely cur-
tailed if the prosecutor's duties are to be properly discharged. The public
prosecutor must recall that he occupies a dual role, being obligated, on the one
hand, to furnish that adversary element essential to the informed decision of
any controversy, but being possessed, on the other hand, of important govern-
mental powers that are pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only,
that of impartial justice. Where the prosecutor is recreant to the trust implicit
in his office, he undermines confidence, not only in his profession, but in gov-
ernment and in the very idea, of justice itself.
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, supra note 9, at 1218.
104. Eg., Brewer v. State, 649 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
105. Eg., Tamminen v. State, 653 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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ited to the defendant, defense counsel, and the judge. If a defendant ap-
peals his conviction, the judges of the appellate court can be added to the
list of "witnesses." To expect the defendant, personally, to report miscon-
duct by a prosecutor is unrealistic. Even if a defendant had the capacity to
recognize unethical trial conduct, reporting the prosecutor to a grievance
committee does not serve the defendant's self-interests.10 6
Defense counsel is the most logical source of reporting. Not only will
defense counsel recognize unethical conduct when it occurs, DR 1-103(A)
places an affirmative duty on every lawyer to report instances of violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the appropriate grievance
committee.107 Only one reported case has been found, however, in which
defense counsel reported a prosecutor to a bar grievance committee. 10 8 A
review of some of the annual reports of the United States Department of
Justice Office of Professional Responsibility and reports of the Prosecutor
Council for the State of Texas revealed very few instances of reports
originating from defense counsel. 0 9 Undoubtedly, defense counsel has the
same disincentives to reporting the prosecutor as does the defendant, for
defense counsel is committed to the cause of the defendant. Furthermore,
if defense counsel prejudices himself with the prosecutor by making a
complaint to the grievance committee, he faces the prospect of the impact
on cases of future clients.
If the defendant and the defendant's lawyer cannot realistically be ex-
pected to report unethical trial conduct by a prosecutor, attention must be
focused on the judges. As the Code of Professional Responsibility directs
the conduct of practicing lawyers, so does the Code of Judicial Conduct
command judges to report instances of unethical conduct to the grievance
committee." 0 Traditionally, American courts have been wary of treading
upon the prerogatives of other departments of government lest they disturb
106. One court has stated:
It flies in the face of reason to expect a defendant to risk a prosecutor's actual
or imagined displeasure by instituting proceedings that cannot directly benefit
him. The defendant may not unreasonably believe such action will adversely
affect his case in subsequent proceedings at the trial, on appeal or at a retrial
following an appeal, or his later chances for parole.
People v. Green, 405 Mich. 273, 274 N.W.2d 448, 464 (1979).
107. DR 1-103(A) provides:
"A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investi-
gate or act upon such violations."
108. In re Burrows, 291 Or. 135, 629 P.2d 820 (1981) (per curiam) (defense counsel re-
ported two prosecutors and each received public reprimand for violating DR 7-104(a)(1),
communicating with represented defendant without defense counsel's consent, and DR 7-
110(B), discussing merits of case with judge without knowledge of defense counsel).
109. From the reports for 1981, 1982, and 1983 of the Prosecutor Council for the State of
Texas, only one instance of a report originating from defense counsel was found: TEX. PROS-
ECUTOR COUNCIL ANN. REP. No. 51-83-31, at 23 (1983). From the reports for 1980 and
1981 of the United States Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility, a total
of 56 complaints from defense counsel were found: 26 complaints in 1981 and 30 complaints
in 1980.
110. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(3) (1972); see also Steele, supra note 25
(reviewing summary power of courts to discipline attorneys).
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the delicate balance of power between the judiciary and the other branches
of government, a fact that appears to have contributed greatly to the suc-
cess of the American system and to the strength of the judicial branch.
Accordingly, trial courts are very reluctant to institute sanctions against
prosecutors, seen as functionaries from another branch of government with
distinct roles of their own to play for the system to stay in equilibrium. '"
Curiously, however, attitudes seem to have shifted insofar as appellate
court judges are concerned. In United States v. Modica'l 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remarked on the futility of
the present system that relies primarily on the reversal of convictions as the
only retort to unethical conduct by prosecutors and suggested that appel-
late courts should begin to play a larger role." 3 Earlier, in People v.
Green,' '4 an opinion by the Supreme Court of Michigan, three of the con-
curring justices suggested that the solution to unethical trial conduct was
for the appellate court to order the clerk to refer the matter to grievance
authorities for appropriate action."15 Similarly, in Jackson v. State, 1 6 a
Florida appellate court served notice that henceforth it would report in-
stances of attorney misconduct to the appropriate state bar agency. De-
spite such assertions by isolated courts, there is no evidence to date that
appellate courts will become a driving force in the enforcement of ethical
standards beyond the act of reversing convictions when appropriate. 1' 7
Even if there was reason for optimism about the prospect of defendants,
trial counsel, trial judges, or appellate judges becoming more aggressive in
reporting unethical misconduct, the adequacy of a typical state bar griev-
ance organization to deal with any but the most egregious examples of
prosecutor misconduct is in doubt. These committees derive their power
from the judiciary and hence share in the reluctance to exert coercive influ-
ence on the office of the prosecutor, especially when a sanction may be
tantamount to removal from office, or at the least, to a serious intervention
between the prosecutor's office and the voters. Furthermore, most lawyers
111. See DeFoor, supra note 82, at 475.
112. 663 F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
113. The court stated:
We share the frustration voiced by commentators at the inability of some fed-
eral prosecutors to abide by well-established rules limiting the types of com-
ments permissible in summation. But we disagree that the solution lies in
reversing valid convictions. . . . A reprimand in a published opinion that
names the prosecutor is not without deterrent effect. A Court of Appeals, ex-
ercising its supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice, may
well have authority to direct the initiation of appropriate action in the District
Court or, alternatively, to take action of a disciplinary nature with respect to
practice before the federal courts of the Circuit, including possible temporary
suspensions. We need not probe the full extent of such authority at this time.
663 F.2d at 1185 (footnotes omitted).
114. 405 Mich. 273, 274 N.W.2d 448 (1979).
115. 274 N.W.2d at 455.
116. 421 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
117. Levy, The Judge's Role in the Enforcement of Ethics-Fear and Learning in the Pro-
fession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 97 (1982) (suggesting that appellate courts should set
forth serious ethical questions that the record brings to their attention and should refer same
to the appropriate agency for investigation).
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who serve on grievance bodies practice primarily in the civil branch of the
justice system, a fact that may make them reluctant to pass judgment on
prosecutors, at least in those instances calling for some insight into the
criminal justice system. Certainly, the prosecution of a criminal case is
arcane from the standpoint of most lawyers. Differences between criminal
practice and civil practice abound. The prosecutor is burdened with a re-
sponsibility, if not a duty, to the victim and to the body politic, as well as a
responsibility to the court and to the defendant. Cast into this schizo-
phrenic muck are such additional complicating factors as the fourth, fifth,
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution; ambivalent
pretrial discovery mechanisms; and keen interest from the news media.
These and other differences between the norms of criminal practice and
the norms of civil practice obviously influence the standards of conduct
expected of lawyers, thus making the judging of those standards an act
requiring considerable expertise.
In the same vein, but at a different leval of abstraction, is the fact that
the concept of the prosecutor's office is multifaceted, requiring many dif-
ferent professional faces, some of which are more visible than others. The
prosecutor as a trial lawyer, as one who charges persons with crime, and as
one who seeks justice through vindication are fairly well-known character-
istics, but the prosecutor as a politician with a constituency that includes
such diverse groups as police, judges, news media, and citizen groups is not
so obvious. For all of these reasons conventional grievance mechanisms
appear inappropriate for prosecutors, and it may be that the great reluc-
tance to discipline prosecutors derives from that sense of
inappropriateness.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR POLICING AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON
PROSECUTORS
What follows is a proposed statute and commentary based in part on an
adaptation of a Texas statute that created the Prosecutor Council of
Texas." 8 This statute creates a new mechanism and procedure to detect
instances of unethical trial conduct by a prosecutor and to impose appro-
priate sanctions for the conduct.
An Act Creating the Prosecutors' Grievance Council
Section 1. Jurisdiction of the Prosecutors' Grievance Council.
There is created the Prosecutors' Grievance Council, hereinafter re-
ferred to as Council, as an administrative agency of the judicial branch
of go vernment to perform the inherent powers of the judiciary to investi-
118. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 332d (Vernon Supp. 1984). The Prosecutor Council
of Texas was created by the Texas Legislature in 1977 to deliver technical assistance, educa-
tional services, and professional development training to Texas prosecutors. Although the
council is allowed to accept complaints about prosecutors, the Texas statute does not ex-




gate instances of unethical conduct committed by prosecutors and to im-
pose sanctions for such conduct.
Commentary
The Texas legislature created a Prosecutor Council with multiple pur-
poses, only one of which is to investigate complaints against prosecu-
tors. 19 The jurisdiction of the Prosecutors' Grievance Council suggested
here is limited to ethical matters only, because it seems incompatible to
cast service functions, such as technical assistance to prosecutors, upon the
same agency that must police and impose sanctions on prosecutors.
Section 2. Membership of the Prosecutors' Grievance Council.
The Council shall be composed of the following members. (1) three
citizens of the state who are not licensed to practice law and who are not
members of law enforcement agencies shall be appointed by the gover-
nor, (2) three incumbent prosecuting attorneys to be elected by the prose-
cuting attorneys of the state,- (3) one judge of a court of appeal one judge
of a trial court with criminal jurisdiction each of whom shall be ap-
pointed by the Supreme Court; and (4) one attorney practicing criminal
defense appointed by the State Bar.
Section 3. Expenses, Terms and Vacancies.
Members of the Council shall receive no compensation for their serv-
ice but are entitled to actual expenses in the performance of their duties.
Members shall serve overlapping three-year terms. In the event a mem-
ber who is a prosecuting attorney or a judge or a defense counsel ceases
to hold such office, or resignsfrom the Council, a vacancy on the Council
arises. Vacancies are filled in the same manner as the original appoint-
ment, such appointments being for the unexpired term of the vacated
position. A member of the Council may be reappointed for two addi-
tional terms.
Section 4. Employment of Employees.
From the funds available to it, the Council may employ such employ-
ees as it deems necessary for the performance of its duties, and may
arrange for and compensate such expert witnesses as the Council may
from time to time seek to consult, and may pay any and all other ex-
penses pertinent and necessary to effectuating the purpose for which the
Council is created.
Commentary
Sections 3 and 4 deal with self-evident administrative matters. The
composition of the Council, covered in section 2, presents multiple issues
that are both political and substantive in nature. The attempt here is to
present a balanced membership. Obviously, this section could be changed
to skew the membership to reflect one perspective or another.
119. Id. An informal survey of other states produced no evidence of a centralized agency
to serve prosecutors comparable to the Texas agency.
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Section 5. Standards of Ethics for Prosecutors.
At all times prosecutors for this State shall adhere to the following
Standards of Ethics.
Standard 1: To ensure the highest ethical conduct and to maintain the
integrity of the prosecution function in the criminal justice system,
the prosecutor shall be thoroughly acquainted with and shall adhere
at all times to the Code of Professional Responsibility as promul-
gatedfor this State.
Standard 2: A prosecutor shall not commit any felony or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude.
Standard 3: A prosecutor shall not willfully engage in conduct inconsis-
tent with his professional duties.
Standard 4: A prosecutor shall not knowingly deny or impede any per-
son in the exercise of any right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed to
such person by the Constitution of the United States or by the Con-
stitution or laws of this State, said prosecutor knowing at the time
that his conduct is unlawful.
Commentary
This list was purposely limited to emphasize the kinds of conduct that
falls within the realm of the advocate role of the prosecutor. Other juris-
dictions may wish to expand the list of standards to include situations such
as mental or physical illness, failure to maintain qualifications required by
law for election to office, or neglect of duty. The argument here is that
such problems should be handled with statutes related to impeachment or
recall procedures and should not be dealt with by a council concerned
mainly with matters of ethics.
Standard 4 is, perhaps, unique. Prosecutorial immunity from suit, a
doctrine of long-standing, was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme
Court in Imbler v. Pachtman.120 In voicing its support of immunity, how-
ever, the Imbler court pointed out that a prosecutor is amenable to profes-
sional discipline by an association of his peers.' 21 Standard 4 is merely an
attempt to ensure the fruition of the Supreme Court's assumption that a
prosecutor who knowingly and purposely violates a citizen's civil rights
will, indeed, be amenable to professional discipline by an association of his
peers.
Section 6. Receipt of Complaint.
A "complaint" is a written communication signed by a complainant
and directed to the Council setting forth allegations that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that a prosecutor has violated a Standard of
120. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
121. Id at 429. The 1mbler Court stated:
[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could de-
prive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional disci-
pline by an association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument
that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors




Ethicsfor Prosecutors. All complaints shall be recorded by the Council
and the respondent-prosecutor shall immediately be furnished with a
copy of said complaint. In the discretion of the chairperson of the Coun-
cil the identity of the complainant may be held confidential.
Section 7. Preliminary Investigation of Complaints.
Without holding any hearing the Council shall investigate each com-
plaint to determine ifprobable cause exists to institute formalproceed-
ings by Writ of Inquiry. If no probable cause is found, the respondent-
prosecuting attorney and the complainant shall be notfied in writing. At
least twice each year the Council shall convenefor this purpose on dates
determined by the chairperson of the Council, such chairperson being
elected by members of the Councilfor one-year terms.
Section 8. Appellate Court Opinions Tantamount to Probable Cause.
Whenever any opinion by an appellate court in this State contains a
finding, implicit or explicit, that a prosecutor has violated a Standard of
Ethics for Prosecutors, that opinion shall be tantamount to probable
cause and the Council shall issue a Writ of Inquiry according to the
procedure established in § 9. To facilitate this process the Chief Justice
of each appellate court shall instruct the clerk of said court to forward to
the Council copies of all such opinions as they are announced by the
court.
Commentary
These sections comprise the intake mechanism for the Council. Com-
plaints may come from individuals, opinions of appellate courts, or the
Council itself. Except when appellate court opinions form the basis of the
complaint, a provision allows for intake screening that will dispose of
groundless or frivolous complaints, avoiding the extra expense and time
required by a formal process. In those jurisdictions with significant com-
plaint volume, assumedly staff personnel will make such preliminary
investigations.
Section 9. Writ of Inquiry
If the Council finds probable cause to institute formal proceedings
based upon findings from investigation of a complaint, or based upon an
appellate court opinion described in § 8, or based upon the Council's
unilateral investigation of a prosecutor's conduct, a Writ of Inquiry shall
be issued to the respondent-prosecutor and to the complainant, if any,
specifying thefactual allegations upon which the inquiry is based and the
Standard(s) of Conductfor Prosecutors alleged to have been violated
The Writ of Inquiry shall contain the date setfor hearing and shall ad-
vise the respondent-prosecutor of his right to file a written answer within
ten (10) days prior to said hearing date.
Section 10. Hearing Master.
After a Writ of Inquiry issues, the Council shall select on a rotating
basis ajudge of an appellate court to serve as a master to determine the
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facts and to submit to the Councilfindings offact and a transcript of all
proceedings before the master.
Section 11. Powers of Hearing Master.
The master shall have the power to administer oaths, to issue subpoe-
nas and other process in conformity with the Rules of Civil Procedure,
including process for depositions, and to impose contempt where appro-
priate for failure to obey said orders.
Section 12 Hearing on Writ of Inquiry.
.4 hearing on the Writ of Inquiry shall be held by the master. This
hearing shall be ex parte in the nature of a grand jury proceeding, and
the respondent-prosecutor shall have no right to confront, cross-examine,
or call witnesses in his own behalf
Commentary
These sections constitute the hearing process. Taken together these pro-
visions are an attempt to maximize due process while avoiding the adver-
sarial model. The Writ of Inquiry provides adequate notice of charges,
and the hearing master insulates the Council from the inherent conflict of
serving as accuser, judge, and jury. The ex parte nature of the hearing is
patterned on the grand jury model and is, in fact, the model often adopted
by state bar grievance committees.122
Section 13. Adjudication.
By majority vote based upon a preponderance of the evidence as deter-
mined from the Hearing Master's Findings of Fact and from the tran-
script of the hearing, the Council shall issue a judgment sustaining the
allegations in the Writ of Inquiry or dismissing the Writ of Inquiry as
unfounded
If the Writ of Inquiry is sustained, the Council shall proceed to order
a sanction according to § 15.
All1judgments and orders of the Council including the outcome of the
voting shall be reduced to writing with a copy forwarded to complainant,
including the clerk of an appellate court where appropriate,- to the re-
spondent-prosecutor; and to the clerk of the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Appeal
Within ten (10) days from recept of the judgment and order of the
Council the respondent-prosecutor may appeal either the judgment sus-
taining the Writ of Inquiry or the sanction, or both. Said appeal shall be
to the Supreme Court and the substantial evidence rule shall apply.
Commentary
These two sections delineate the adjudication and appeal process. Ap-
peal may be taken either from the finding of a violation of the Standards
of Ethics for Prosecutors or from the sanction itself. Perhaps the only
122. Nordby, supra note 79, at 383.
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noteworthy issue in these two sections is whether the resulting scheme is
too summary in nature and lacking in due process. Some might argue that
if the hearing on the facts is to be ex parte, section 12, and the adjudication
process is likewise ex parte, section 13, without even the right of summa-
tion, then at least the appellate process should be de novo, instead of to the
Supreme Court as suggested in section 14. Of course, the use of the sub-
stantial evidence rule on appeal is controversial as well. The approach
taken in sections 12, 13, and 14 reflects an attitude that the prosecutor's
office is well suited to a summary disciplinary procedure, reflecting a social
attitude that the prosecutor is presumed to be above reproach and unlikely
to need the extra protections required by more ordinary officials or indi-
viduals against whom disciplinary proceedings might be brought in other
circumstances.
Section 15. Sanctions.
L In imposing sanctions the Council may consider previous in-
stances where theprosecutor has been found to have violated a Standard
of Ethics for Prosecutors.
2 If a prosecuting attorney is disbarred or suspended by the State
Bar, or has been found guilty of any felony or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude, he shall be considered suspended from office pending
the outcome of a petition for removalfrom office.
3. The chairperson of the Council may petition for the removalfrom
office of any prosecutor who has been found by the Council to have vio-
lated a Standard of Ethics for Prosecutors.
4. The Council may order a prosecutor fined from $1.00 to
$1,000.00.
5. The Council may issue an admonition and/or requirement that
the prosecutor obtain additional training or education.
Commentary
For a prosecutor, suspension or disbarment is not a practical sanction
because it is tantamount to removal from office, and removal from office is
a mechanism specifically formalized by various statutes in each state. The
addition of fines as a sanction is intended to add flexibility to the sanction-
ing process. Private reprimands are not provided as a possible sanction,
which is consistent with the public nature of the prosecutor's office and
with the approach taken in section 13 that the complainant is entitled to a
written copy of the Council's ultimate judgment.
Section 16. Confidentiality.
All proceedings before the hearing master and all proceedings of the
Council, except judgments and orders of the Council, shall be confiden-
tial. In cases where the chairperson of the Council considers that the
notoriety of a proceeding has resulted in misleading speculation among
the public, the chairperson may issue a briefpublic statement, not refer-
ring to any evidence and setting forth the expected date of the filing of
the Council's orders and judgment in the matter.
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Commentary
Confidentiality of the grievance procedure against any professional is
always a matter of balancing the right of the public to know against the
right of the individual professional to privacy. Since the judgment of the
Council is public record, section 13, and since persons who testify before
the hearing master are not required to keep their testimony confidential, a
neutral balance has been struck. The public will learn of the Council's
judgment, and any witness who cares to discuss publicly his allegations or
his evidence is free to do so.
Section 17. Quorum.
A quorum of the Council shall befive. A quorum is necessary for the
transaction of any business.
Section 18. Statute of Limitations.
The Prosecutors' Grievance Council has no jurisdiction over any alle-
gation of conduct occurring more than five (5) years prior to the filing of
a complaint orjudgment by a court of appeal or a unilateral investiga-
tion by the Council, provided, however, that this limitation shall not run
until the conduct is discovered if theprosecutor made an effort to conceal
said conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
The public, the bench, and the bar all have the right to expect a prosecu-
tor to be the most ethical of advocates. Anything less tarnishes the image
of the benevolent power of the state and lessens the worth of a criminal
justice system already suffering from numerous weaknesses. However, all
available evidence points to the fact that we cannot expect prosecutors to
maintain such high standards single-handedly.
For too long we have ignored a self-evident fact-unethical conduct by
prosecutors at trial is seldom dealt with by the grievance process. Conse-
quently, we might expect prosecutors to feel some degree of freedom to
comport themselves with a zeal that exceeds the bounds of proper profes-
sional conduct. The existence of this situation is proof enough of the fail-
ure of the conventional grievance mechanisms to deal with the unique
personage presented by the image of the professional prosecutor.
What is needed is a new approach to the issue of controlling prosecutors'
conduct at trial. One new approach has been suggested here. Others may
have better ideas. Something must change.
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